A label came off
Zero Data Retention is a simple promise: the prompt and the response are not stored. On OpenRouter, it is also a label attached to specific model endpoints, and for MiniMax models that label is now gone.
The removal arrived by email, not by blog post. On November 21, customers began posting a notice titled "Requests you sent to MiniMax models may have been read." One recipient published the full text, noting that OpenRouter has no public page for it. Each notice is personalized, listing how many MiniMax requests that account sent, through which providers, and over what dates.
The test behind the notice is narrow. A security researcher placed unique test URLs in prompts sent to MiniMax models between July and October 2026. A third party accessed them anyway, 40 to 130 hours after the requests were sent. The email does not say who accessed the URLs, or whether every request produced a fetch. What it says is that a third party may have read the prompts and outputs of these requests.
It also happened on both routes: requests MiniMax served directly, and requests another provider forwarded to MiniMax. Three providers, AtlasCloud, Novita and StreamLake, told OpenRouter they had forwarded OpenRouter's MiniMax requests on to MiniMax. The same tests run against other models at those providers were not accessed, with one exception OpenRouter does not detail. None of the AWS test keys planted in the MiniMax requests was used.
Who says what
OpenRouter's email is careful about where it stands. Based on what the researcher and the three providers reported, it says, "the issue sits with MiniMax and the providers that forwarded to it, not with OpenRouter," and it is passing on what it was told. That is OpenRouter's assessment, attributed in its own email to what it was told, not an established finding.
MiniMax's explanation arrives at third hand. It told StreamLake, which told OpenRouter, which told its customers: content moderation was enabled on its endpoints before October 22, and it has since enabled Zero Data Retention. OpenRouter adds that it has asked MiniMax for its own account and has not received one.
Read those two statements together and the open questions are plain. Content moderation explains why a provider might process prompt content. It does not, on the record available, explain who opened test URLs two to five days later, or from where. And "ZDR has since been enabled" is a claim about the present that customers cannot check from outside. That is not a reason to dismiss it. It is a reason to treat it as a claim.
A separate Dragos study
Two days earlier, a larger canary study made a related point at industry scale. HD Moore, chief research officer at Dragos, published his results on November 19: roughly two million prompts carrying unique URLs and canary credentials, sent to widely used AI services between July and November, with every later use of those secrets logged. This article treats the study and the OpenRouter email as separate sources: Dragos names none of the companies in its findings, and neither primary text states that the two are connected.
The breaches in that study are worse than the MiniMax case. Attackers were actively copying data at at least three hosting providers, none of which knew until Dragos told them. In the largest case, a couple of hundred AWS keys sent in a few short windows in late October were all stolen, some from requests the provider had rejected before a model ever ran, which places the copying at the provider's front door. The keys were tested within hours and used for tens of thousands of AWS calls.
The second finding needed no attacker. Resellers on an inference marketplace could view and retain customer prompts using standard logging. Dragos isolated them by sending identical prompts through different sellers; the secrets came back only through certain sellers, in one case opened from a home connection about a day and a half later.
The third finding is about privacy settings. Dragos describes an unnamed Chinese lab whose systems fetched the secret URLs from more than half of the prompts sent to its models between July and October, including roughly two-thirds of the requests marked "no data collection" or Zero Data Retention, typically two or three days after the request. Prompts sent to US providers that resold the lab's models triggered the same fetches. In a separate incident, a secret link was posted into a Feishu company chat 24 days after the prompt was sent, and opened within two minutes from desktops and phones in Beijing and Shanghai. Dragos notes that its disclosure to that provider included only the link's first eight characters, so whoever shared it had the full URL from somewhere; Dragos's own reading is that they were reading a stored copy of the full prompt.
What to do if you routed MiniMax traffic
If your account is one of the ones OpenRouter emailed, the notice itself defines the exposure: your MiniMax requests, direct or forwarded, in the dates it lists. Anything sensitive in those prompts or outputs, credentials, internal documents, customer data, should be treated as potentially read. Rotate credentials that appeared in them. That advice follows from OpenRouter's own wording, "may have been read"; it is not a confirmed breach of any individual account.
For everyone else, the practical lesson is about what a privacy label is. A ZDR badge on a router is a provider's represented policy, passed along. The router cannot see what happens to text after it leaves for the endpoint, and a forwarding hop can change the endpoint without changing the name on the request. Dragos's version of the general point is structural: "every hop can see the entire prompt and response." If the data is sensitive enough that retention would hurt, the controls that reduce exposure are the boring ones: go direct to the model provider under one contract, pin which upstream providers a router may use, keep secrets out of prompts, and, as Dragos suggests, seed your own canaries so a leak announces itself. None of those guarantees how an endpoint handles text; they reduce the number of hands it passes through.
Sources
- [1] OpenRouter customer email, "Requests you sent to MiniMax models may have been read", full text posted by a recipient on Hacker News, November 21, 2026Read source
- [2] Dragos (HD Moore), "AI Supply Chain Security: What Canary Tokens Found", November 19, 2026, updated November 20, 2026Read source